Abstract We analyze the inference problem for distributed databases.
Introduction
Often, database managers must decide which non-sensitive data to release. This is referred to as data sanitization or data downgrading. Issues surrounding downgrading are of particular importance to network architectures which utilize a multiple single level 14 approach for keeping sensitive data away from the generic user. In a distributed environment, data may be distributed among di erent data sites e.g., 22 . Therefore, before data is downgraded, database managers must take i n to account other data that users may h a ve access to.
Let us call the authorized users who either manage the entire database e.g., database managers, or who are allowed access to the entirety of the data High, and the generic user, for whom access is restricted Low. Of course we are tacitly assuming that there are two t ypes of data: low data which is available to all, and sensitive data to which only High users are allowed access. Thus, High data High's data may h a ve both sensitive and non-sensitive components. High's concern is to keep the sensitive information away from Low. Therefore, High is allowed to downgrade the non-sensitive parts to Low.
For information sharing needs, High decides which data to release to Low. Obviously, High will not release sensitive data. However, database inference occurs when Low is able to infer the sensitive information from the data that is released. To prevent database inference, non-sensitive This research is supported by the O ce of Naval Research. data which is related to sensitive data must beexamined and perhaps modi ed, thus requiring further data sanitization. The problem of preventing database inference in a stand-alone database is quite challenging and has recently been under intensive study from diverse aspects e.g., 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 11 13 15 16 17 18 19 29 30 . Database inference in distributed databases is an area in which v ery little work has been done. In 11 , the authors showed that sensitive information can berevealed if users link information from several databases in a deterministic manner. However, the deterministic approach does not concern itself with the equally important problem of probabilistic relationships embedded in the data. We analyze the inference problem under a probabilistic framework.
Let us consider the following scenario which we will use throughout the paper. Given a database D consisting of categorical attributes, the most common technique for mitigating inference is that of modifying the non-sensitive data i.e., values of attributes in the database. However, even with appropriate data modi cation, sensitive data can still becompromised when data from other databases is incorporated. For instance, an AIDS diagnosis is often considered sensitive and is not disclosed. Given a second database containing information related to drug abuse, however, one may discover from the two databases that drug abusers' intravenous injections may cause these individuals to contract AIDS. Therefore, knowing a patient's history of drug injection could allow one to infer that the patient has a higher chance of contracting AIDS than does the general population, even if the diagnosis has not been revealed. Information about patients' drug abuse should therefore be treated as sensitive. As another example, the occurrence of nonHodgkin lymphomas NHL is higher in AIDS patients than it is in the general population. Hence, the diagnosis of NHL should also be treated as sensitive, since there is a high correlation between AIDS and NHL. On the other hand, while, an AIDS patient may show signs of mental depression, depression is a common symptom of many diseases, such a s low t h yroid function. Thus, the symptom of mental depression may not beindicative of an AIDS diagnosis. Of concern, however, is that fact that, in a distributed environment, Low m a y obtain additional attribute data as discussed above which m a y allow L o w to infer sensitive data|in this case, a diagnosis of AIDS.
Conceptual Model
We proposed a stand-alone model, the Rational Downgrader 20 , for downgrading sanitization using inferential analysis. In a distributed environment, the conceptual model of the Rational Downgrader must be modi ed to include knowledge" from both external data items and their rules.
Because external data items and their rules were not in the original model, the Rational Downgrader is composed of three components: the GUARD, the Decision Maker, and the Parsimonious Downgrader or Filter. Initially, High inputs its candidate for the data that it would like to release to Low. The Decision Maker generates rules from the available data set, and uses the external data items and their associated rules, to form its output rules. The GUARD determines whether there is inference, and if it is excessive" based on the Decision Maker's rules. If the inference is excessive, then the Parsimonious Downgrader will implement a protection plan to lessen the inference i.e., decides to modify by deleting certain data from the database. The inference mechanism is based on a decision theoretical framework e.g., 10 21 23 27 28 . It is the Bayesian network framework that will be used for our inference analysis in this paper. The output of the Rational Downgrader is the database to bereleased to Low. Our goal is to make modi cations as parsimoniously as possible and thus avoid imposing unnecessary changes which lessen functionality.
A Bayesian network describes the probabilistic dependency relationships among the attributes of a database. A Bayesian network B may begenerated from empirical data or can beconstructed from a priori knowledge.
In a distributed system, it is misleading to evaluate downgrading in one database only. Publicly released data from one database may cause the inference of sensitive data in another database. If to-be-released data causes additional inference concerns due to another database, the Parsimonious Downgrader will incorporate the new requirements into its protection plan. As a result, only a mutually agreed upon data set will be released.
Database Inference
We consider the case for which sensitive data is associated with one particular attribute. In a medical database, AIDS diagnoses are the sensitive information. We use High database and Low database to indicate, respectively, the portion of a database viewed by a database manager the High user and a generic Low user. We are interested in studying probabilistic in uences on the sensitive information from attributes that are related to the medical diagnosis only. See, e.g., 1 3 for disclosure protection of background attributes e.g., age, address. A sample of those relevant attributes is given in Table 1 . Table 1 is the medical database for AIDS diagnoses which contains 20 data records i.e., patients, which are uniquely identi ed by their key, and four attributes excluding the key i.e., hepatitis," depression," AIDS" and transfusion" where each attribute has two v alues: a`y' indicating the occurrence of the diagnosis result and an`n' otherwise. In addition, Table 1 shows the High view denoted here as D H in our discussion. The diagnosis of one disease e.g., AIDS" often causes the occurrence of another physical disorder e.g., mental depression". Consequently, knowing the diagnosis of a physical disorder may lead to the inference of sensitive information i.e., AIDS about a patient. Thus, to protect sensitive information about one disease may require the protection of other probabilistically-related records. In this paper, we u s e a B a yesian network representation to describe the probabilistic relationship. A corresponding Bayesian network representation is given in Figure 1H 1 see 10 21 for details on how to construct a Bayesian network, which shows that AIDS" may a ect the consequence of both hepatitis" and mental depression" and a cause of AIDS" is a blood transfusion. B-net of the Low. Table 2 shows the database after being initially downgraded denoted here as D L . Table 2 is what High would input into the Rational Downgrader, a patient is identi ed by its key. The threat with which w e are concerned is that of Low inferring sensitive relations about the ith data item or record in the database. The dashes represent data that is considered sensitive and, thus, is not downgraded. Note that Table 2 is not in the form in which it will bereleased; it has not yet undergone the procedure that determines whether excessive inference may exist.
A target attribute T is an attribute that has dashes meaning missing in it from Low's viewpoint. Thus, T represents sensitive information.
We wish to lessen any inference that Low may attempt to draw about the target node. Since data is not completely revealed, the corresponding Bayesian network structure 3 for D L di ers from that of D H and is shown in Figure 1L . The challenge for Low who is attempting to discern sensitive information is to restore the missing information in Table 2 .
Note that Table 2 still contains the AIDS" attribute, even though the values are all missing. This is because we take paranoid" view that Low knows what sensitive attribute High is concerned with, and because, in general, sensitive information may be distributed across many attributes and all the values may not be missing.
Initial downgrading may not be su cient to protect the sensitive data. Again, we take the paranoid" view that the Low obtains the prior knowledge from previous studies, for example about the dependency relationship between AIDS and the three attributes mental depression," hepatitis," and transfusion." The dependency relationship is described in Figure 1H . Certainly, it is not a surprise that Low could have the prior" information it desires concerning an important medical condition such as AIDS. With information concerning the dependency, together with data in the Low database of Table 2 , Low may beable to restore the hidden sensitive data. A sample restored Low database is shown in Table 3 .
Compared with the original values in Table 1 , the restored values of Table 3 di er in just four places. The probability of making a correct determination is 16=20 = 0:8. This is unacceptable. The threat of potential restoration highlights the inadequacy of initial downgrading. We shall mitigate the inference by not downgrading certain non-sensitive information that can lead to probabilistic inferences about the sensitive information 2 .
Distributed Databases
In the real world, there may be several databases 22 that have a n impact on the sensitive information contained in the original downgraded database. The inference problem, therefore, should take i n to account the impact of having di erent databases.
These multiple databases may h a ve exactly the same structure and or they may have overlapping content. The possible interactions between two databases in the form of relational tables, with schemes R 1 a 1 ; :::a k , and R 2 b 1 ; :::; b l are the following. R 2 augments R 1 with data records, R 2 augments R 1 with di erent attributes, or a combination.
What we consider here is when two databases are in di erent contexts or, applications, but have attributes which o verlap i.e., the third type of interaction. Also, we assume that data records of the two databases come from the same sample population, but the attribute values of some objects may be unknown. We shall use the structure of a Bayesian network and non-sensitive micro-data in our discussion.
Data transferred from the second database may or may not have direct impact on the sensitive information of the rst database. High will integrate some, but not all, publicly released information from di erent databases that may cause the disclosure of sensitive data. Combinations of all data may render inference analysis an impossible task due to high volumes of data. We shall analyze the impact based on network dependency properties 21 and our practical sanitization policies with the following three databases. Table 4 shows the diagnosis of non-Hodgkin lymphomas NHL disease | a NHL patient is highly likely to be a AIDS patient. Thus, data in Table 4 cannot be released 4 if the database manager of the NHL database also agrees with the sanitization downgrading principle that AIDS data must be kept private. Based on a Bayesian network model of Table 5 , low t h yroid function causes mental depression, which in turn causes high bloodpressure. For a mentally depressed patient, information concerning the patient's low t h yroid function would have a negative impact on a possible AIDS diagnosis. The degree of impact depends on the correlation between AIDS and mental depression. It can be tested with available data. However, knowing the state of mental depression would block the impact of information concerning blood pressure. Table 6 is an database including information about illegal drug use, which shows the frequency with which an illegal drug user either takes intravenous injections or smokes. Data indicates an individual who injects illegal drugs is likely to have hepatitis. The relationship between AIDS and drug abuse is not shown in Table 6 . However, for an intravenous drug abuser, intravenous injection is basically a form of blood transfusion. 5 Thus, the probability that an illegal intravenous drug abuser is also an AIDS patient is high. Table 7 shows the combination of the original High data with records of illegal intravenous drug abusers and records of the thyroid function, where the *" denotes attribute values that are unknown because data records of these databases are not completely overlapped. 6 Here, the assumption is that the database manager of the AIDS database is able to identify and select patients from the other two databases. The dependency relationship between attributes of the combined database is given by the Bayesian network B H of Figure 2 . Note that Figure 2 resulted from composing dependency relationships derived from these three databases, together with the knowledge about the relationship between intravenous injection and blood transfusion, and is not generated from combined data. 7 In Figure  2 , the probabilistic dependency of the inverted fork e.g., the child node hepatitis" and parent nodes injection" and AIDS" is described by the or-ing operation i.e., either AIDS" or injection" causes hepati- The combined Bayesian network BH.
tis" as P r hepatitis=yjinjection=y,AIDS=y = 1 , P r hepatitis=njinjection=y P r hepatitis=njAIDS=y, where P r hepatitis=njinjection=y and P r hepatitis=njAIDS=y are obtained respectively from the released data of the drug abuse and the AIDS databases. The probabilistic dependency between depression," Thyroid" and AIDS" will also follow the or-ing relationship. The probabilistic information between depression" and blood pressure" will remain unchanged. The relationship between injection" and transfusion" is of the form is a. It is known that the generation of a reliable complex network model, in general, demands large volumes of data. Here, we assume that the dependency relationship derived from each individual database is preserved in the combined database. For our current example, this assumption referred to as dependency inheritance under combination seems to bevalid. It is useful in handling the combination of multiple large databases, yet its validity has not been formally proved.
Information Reduction
Recall that we showed the inadequacy of initial downgrading, because in our example 80 of the sensitive data was restored. The inference problem worsens if Low gleans information that is causally correlated to sensitive data from other publicly-released databases. This result suggests that High must adopt strategies for mitigating the inference problem based on data of the combined database. Therefore, since certain non-sensitive information can lead to probabilistic inferences about the sensitive information, we approach the problem of lessening inference by not downgrading all of the distributed non-sensitive information.
We modify non-sensitive data by blocking," i.e., replacing an attribute value with a ?," indicating no knowledge about the attribute value. 8 Given a database D, w e let D m denote D after at least one of its non-sensitive entries has been blocked. Instead of sending D L to Low, High blocks some of the non-sensitive information, and sends D m L to Low.
Shannon mathematically formalized the idea of secrecy 25 in cryptography. We use the similar de nition of perfect noninference 20 for database inference:
DEF: I f t h e a priori probability distribution of sensitive High data does not change in the presence of Low data, then we h a ve perfect noninference.
The ideal downgrading policy for distributed databases is one that ensures perfect noninference. The condition of perfect noninference is unlikely to beachieved in practice because of performance issues. Our pragmatic policy of lessening inference states that modi cation of nonsensitive information should lessen the inference of sensitive information, while, at the same time, minimizing the loss of functionality.
For a given database, we measure the e ect of modi cation, , based on the probabilistic term P r DjB, which describes the sample probability, given the probabilistic dependency representation B. In essence, is a measure of the loss of functionality o f a d o wngraded database. is a metric of the Low view and is measured by High.
where P r D m L jB L is computed by averaging over instantiations of the modi ed values. We evaluate the AIDS database only because we may not have control over other databases. The tolerance provides a margin within which the information protection strategies operate. Thus, we often associate an upper bound U to , so that U . measures the percentage of change in a sample probability. can be viewed as a sensitivity metric which estimates the rate of change in the output of a model with respect to changes in model inputs 12 . Our emphasis is on the magnitude of the change in probability. The log-scale measure base 10 is used in this criterion to re ect the fact that the sample probability is a small number as a result of multiplication of the probabilities of each individual data record. Therefore a logarithmic approach somewhat normalizes the probabilities.
What criterion is used for High to select non-sensitive attribute values for modi cation blocking? Such a selection criterion is not unique. We present t wo selection criteria that are based on a Bayesian network framework. SC1 maximum di erence:
Intuitively, attribute values which maximally change the probability of target values, T = t i , in terms of the probabilistic model B H as shown in Figure 2 , should beselected. The set of attribute values is associated with non-sensitive information, or, in the current example, the non-target attribute. Since B H best interprets the data D H from which it is derived and since the quality of modi ed database is expected to deteriorate, we w ant to select the set of attribute values that maximally We use averaging because the value of N in our experiment is small. In case of large N , the value for modi cation i.e., ?" may be viewed as a new symbol because instantiation could induce large variation when computing the sample probability and also be very time consuming. Note that we discard those values of P r D m H j B H that are greater than P r D H j B H . We do not think that situation will arise due to our unproven observation that modication results in decreasing the likelihood measure. We shall show the result of modi cation based on this criterion after we present the second selection criterion. SC2 non-informative state: We do not discuss this method due to pale limits. However, we will consider it in future work.
As discussed, lets us measure how the functionality of the database for the Low user, after blocking modi cations, has changed with respect to Low. With the de nitions of SC1 in mind, our optimization goal is to Maximize V 1 , while keeping U , i f V 1 is chosen.
For modi cation, our approach is to evaluate attribute values of the AIDS database and analyze the potential impact from combined data. Let N denote the total numberof non-targeted attribute values to be modi ed. Assume that N = 4, U = 5. Now we use the selection criterion SC1 for our example. Consider the original Low database of Table 2 . The modi ed Low database set is given in Table 8 by using SC1. The choice that maximizes V 1 is that of blocking the hepatitis" value for data item three, the depression" value for data item four, and items three and eight from transfusion." Modi cation is restricted to attribute values of the original Low database. From Figure 2 , it can be seen that inference occurs if Low obtains information about injection. This information can beused to restore the modi ed values of transfusion," if the relationship between blood transfusion and injection is known a priori. This result will render sanitization a failure.
To remedy this, we consider two cases: that of downgrading in a cooperative environment, and in a non-cooperative environment. In a cooperative e n vironment, an e ective approach i s t o m utually examine the data sets to bereleased. In our example, the to-be-released data from the AIDS site is sent to the drug abuse site for examination. Of course, one party needs to initiate the move. Based on the received data, the drug abuse database manager makes modi cations to its own data in order to ensure the safety of those values that have been modi ed from the AIDS database. The result is then sent back to the AIDS database. In our example, the modi ed combined database is given in Table 9 , where values of injection" are replaced by ?" in the third and the eighth data records, because injection" causally a ects transfusion" as described in Figure 2 . Note that since hepatitis" is also causally correlated with injection", modi cation of injection" in the third record also minimizes restoration of a ?" with respect to hepatitis" of the same record. Attributes that are causally related to depression" are thyroid" and blood pressure." Since both values of thyroid" and blood pressure" of the fourth record are unknown, no further modication is needed. Table 9 is the downgraded Low database. One may choose to replace symbols -", ?" and *" with a blank space and the outcome of the replacement is the Low database of Table 10 . Of course, in a non-cooperative environment, if the drug abuse database manager has already released his or her data, the manager of the AIDS database may take the defensive measure of increasing N . Such modication will, of course, occur at the expense of lowering the performance of the released database.
We do not impose a de nite limit on the amount of data to be modi ed. The rule of thumb is that the process of modi cation stops when the modi ed database can no longer support the Bayesian network structure of the original database. See also 4 for the estimation of lower bound. The change usually undermines legitimate usage of a database.
Conclusion
The database inference problem with respect to distributed databases is essentially a new research area. In this paper, we analyzed the infer-ence problem arising from distributed databases and we presented our approach which is based on the framework of Bayesian networks. Notes 1. Figure 1H is a Bayesian Network for High B H . An attribute is denoted by a node. An arrow indicates the probabilistic dependency between two attributes. A double circle denotes that the attribute is sensitive.
2. Our sample database is more representative of data taken at the beginning of the AIDS epidemic, rather than today.
3. There are many w ays to construct a Bayesian net. Figures 1H and Figure 1L are constructed as in 2 by using a greedy model search.
4. The AIDS and the NHL databases can certainly exchange data through a special channel. But, again, the NHL database may not be released to Low and it is not considered part of the distributed data.
5. Clearly, drug injection" is not identi ed with blood transfusion in either database. Nonetheless, it is not a secret that intravenous injection of a drug involves the drawing of blood and drug abusers often share needles.
6. The position of a data item in either thyroid or drug database the 1st number and its corresponding position in the combined table the second number are as follows: thyroid: 1-1, 2-2 3-3 4-6 5-7 7-9 9-11 11-13 12-14 13-15 15-17 17-19 18-20 drug: 1-1 3-2 4-3 6-6 8-8 9-10 12-12 13-13 17-17 18-18 19-19 20-20 7 . If the combined network is generated from the combined data, the unknown mark *" can be treated as a new value.
8. We do not use perturbation i.e., replacing an attribute value with another di erent value, which i n troduces erroneous data, because of the negative performance side e ects.
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